Abstract I critically discuss Sutton’s 2012 attempt to solve the so-called “grounding problem” for coincident objects, namely, the difficulty of explaining how such objects, such as a statue and the lump of clay from which it was made, can have distinct kind and modal properties, even though they share the same proper parts and basic microphysical properties. Sutton bases her solution on an account of the extrinsic composition of the different sorts of objects involved in such cases - in particular, artefacts, organisms and persons. I show that the accounts she gives of their composition are flawed, and that her proposal therefore does not solve the grounding problem.

Resumen Presento y evalúo críticamente el análisis de las teorías de la conspiración presentado por Quassim Cassam en su libro Conspiracy Theories (2019a). Sostengo que su distinción entre los tipos problemáticos y no problemáticos de las teorías que refieren a conspiraciones resulta útil a la hora de evaluar el fenómeno, pero señalo algunas debilidades en su caracterización, así como en su tratamiento de las causas y los efectos nocivos de la creencia en estas teorías.

Abstract I present and critically examine the analysis of conspiracy theories presented by Quassim Cassam in his book Conspiracy Theories (2019a). I hold that the distinction he draws between problematic and unproblematic kinds of theories that report conspiracies is useful for an assessment of the phenomenon, but I draw attention to some shortcomings in the way he characterizes it, as well as in his treatment of the causes and the harmful effects of belief in such theories.

Abstract: I consider some of the objections that have been raised against a conceptualist solution to the “grounding problem” (the problem of grounding the sortalish properties of material objects in their non-sortalish ones), I address in particular two objections that I call Conceptual Validity and Instantiation, and I attempt to answer them on behalf of the conceptualist. My response, in a nutshell, is that the first of these objections fails because it ascribes to the conceptualist some commitments that do not really follow from the view’s basic insight, while the second objection also fails because (among other things) it (inadvertently) denies the conceptualist resources that the alternative positions are allowed to use.

Resumen: En este trabajo considero algunas críticas que se han formulado a la solución conceptualista al “problema de la fundamentación” (el problema de cómo fundar las propiedades de tipo clasificatorio de los objetos materiales a partir de sus propiedades de tipo no clasificatorio), en particular dos objeciones que denomino aquí Validez conceptual e Instanciación, y trato de dar una respuesta desde la perspectiva del conceptualista. Básicamente sostengo que la primera de estas objeciones falla porque atribuye al conceptualista ciertos compromisos que de hecho no se siguen de la intuición conceptualista básica, mientras que la segunda objeción también falla debido (entre otras cosas) a que se deniega (inadvertidamente) al conceptualista recursos que se permiten a las posiciones alternativas.

Abstract In this paper I present and critically discuss Simon Evnine’s account of hylomorphically complex objects (as presented in his 2016 book Making Objects and Events). On the one hand, I object to the account he gives of how artifacts (which are for him the paradigmatic cases of hylomorphically complex objects) allegedly acquire their existence and identity conditions. I elaborate on two problems I see for this account: first, that it seems unable to explain our knowledge of the kinds to which artifacts belong; second, that it cannot offer a plausible solution to the grounding problem for coincident objects. I also object to the way in which he tries to adapt the sort of account he gave for artifacts to the case of organisms (in my view this fails because both cases are dissimilar at crucial points), and finally I also object to his attempt to extend that account, in a fictional way, to the case of natural non-organic objects (as I try to show, both his arguments to the effect that there are no such objects, and his positive fictionalist proposal to account for our talk about them, are flawed).

Abstract I examine Nathan Salmon’s solution to the problem of trivialization, as it arises for conceptions of general term rigidity that construe it as identity of designation across possible worlds. I argue that he does not succeed in showing that some alleged general terms, such as “the colour of the sky” are non-rigid, but also that a small class of different examples that he presents, which can be construed as second order descriptions, are indeed non-rigid general terms, although for reasons different from those he thought.

Resumen Examino aquí la solución propuesta por Nathan Salmon al problema de la trivialización que, según suele suponerse, aqueja a las concepciones de la rigidez para términos generales entendida como identidad de designación en los distintos mundos posibles. Sostengo que este autor no logra mostrar que algunos supuestos términos generales, tales como “the colour of the sky”, son no rígidos, pero también que una pequeña clase de ejemplos distintos que él ofrece, que se pueden entender como descripciones de segundo orden, sí resultan ser términos generales no rígidos, aunque por razones distintas que las que él supone.

In the present paper I defend an interpretation of the Cartesian notion of material falsity that it would be adequate to describe as 'epistemic', as opposed to most other views in the literature, which could be described as 'metaphysical'. Whereas metaphysical conceptions of material falsity consider an idea to be such because of some kind of failure in their representative properties, that is, in the relation between what they exhibit and their objects, an epistemic view considers that what makes an idea materially false is some kind of opacity that precludes their representational properties to be known in the first place. In the paper the evidence for these two kinds of reading is assessed, and it is shown that epistemic views are clearly more adequate.

En este trabajo se defiende una interpretación de la noción cartesiana de falsedad material que cabe calificar de 'epistémica', por oposición a las interpretaciones más corrientes en la literatura, que cabe calificar globalmente como 'metafísicas'. Mientras que una concepción metafísica de la falsedad material considera que las ideas son tales a causa del fallo en alguna de las propiedades representativas de las ideas, esto es, en la relación entre lo exhibido por ellas y sus objetos, una concepción epistémica considera que lo que hace a una idea materialmente falsa es cierta opacidad que impide que puedan conocerse sus propiedades representativas en primer lugar. En el trabajo se evalúa la evidencia para cada uno de estos tipos de lecturas y se muestra que la de tipo epistémico es claramente más adecuada.

In this paper, we analyze critically the interpretation offered by Mario Caimi of the cartesian arguments presented in the Sixth Meditation in order to prove the existence of material bodies. We disagree with his interpretation. This disagreement is based, mainly, in a different interpretation of the role that imagination plays in those proofs. We present here some arguments, both textual and philosophical, that strongly suggest an alternative interpretation, which we present in outline.

En este trabajo presentamos un análisis crítico de la interpretación que ofrece Mario Caimi de los argumentos cartesianos de la Meditación Sexta en favor de la existencia de las cosas materiales. Estamos en desacuerdo con dicha interpretación. Este desacuerdo se basa, en particular, en una interpretación distinta del papel de la imaginación en dichas pruebas. En el trabajo presentamos argumentos de base textual y filosófica que apuntan a favor de una interpretación alternativa que desarrollamos someramente.

In this essay, I present a problem that originates in Kripke's contention, in Naming and Necessity, that natural kind terms are rigid, namely, the problem of how to understand the notion of rigidity when it is applied to general terms. I also give an account, in a principled way, of the main theoretical options that seem to be available to solve that problem, and sketch the main features of Michael Devitt's proposal against that background.

En este trabajo, hago una presentación de un problema que Kripke deja planteado al sostener, en El nombrar y la necesidad, que los términos de género natural son rígidos, a saber, el de cómo debería ser entendida la noción de rigidez cuando ésta es aplicada a los términos generales. Asimismo, trazo un panorama de las distintas opciones teóricas disponibles, y presento las tesis centrales de la propuesta de Michael Devitt a la luz de este marco.

In my contribution to the discussion, I argue against Javier Castro Albano's contention (2007) that the four theses he presents, which are allegedly prima facie plausible, but nonetheless not simultaneously acceptable, pose a problem to strong truthmaker theories. I try to do so by suggesting that some of these theses have ontologically committed and ontologically innocent readings, and that while their initial plausibility is connected to the latter readings, the problems shown by Castro Albano arise only when they are read in the former way. But this should not be seen as particularly threatening, because holding any of the relevant theses in this ontologically committed way depends on previous and independent commitments concerning the metaphysics of modality, commitments which at the same time should preclude us from accepting the stronger reading of some of the other theses (avoiding, in this way, the incompatibility pointed out by Castro Albano).

En mi contribución a la discusión, ataco la postura de Javier Castro Albano (2007) según la cual las cuatro tesis que él presenta, que supuestamente son prima facie plausibles, aunque no aceptables simultáneamente, presentan un problema para las teorías fuertes de los hacedores de verdad. Para hacerlo, sugiero que algunas de esas tesis tienen tanto lecturas ontológicamente comprometidas como ontológicamente inocentes, y que mientras su plausibilidad inicial se conecta con estas últimas lecturas, los problemas señalados por Castro Albano sólo surgen cuando son leídas del primer modo. Pero esto no debería ser visto como particularmente amenazador, porque sostener cualquiera de las tesis relevantes de este modo ontológicamente comprometido deriva de compromisos previos e independientes acerca de la metafísica de la modalidad, compromisos que justamente nos forzarían a rechazar la lectura más fuerte de alguna de las otras tesis (evitando, de este modo, la supuesta incompatibilidad señalada por Castro Albano).